

The Rule of Likely Negation in Fully Closed Systems

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This rule relates to closed systems that cannot be disassembled and investigated directly or indirectly. Its conclusion is that when there are multiple possibilities, more than two, the negation of any of these possibilities will be more expected than proving it, and the expectation of this negation increases progressively as the number of probability possibilities increases. On the contrary, the value of the probability of proof decreases more and more as the possibilities increase.

In general, the axis of negation is more likely on a proof when there is doubt and hesitation between them, due to the multiplicity of possibilities of negation, in contrast to the axis of proof.

For example, if we wanted to estimate the number of stars in our celestial galaxy, we would expect the error of any number we choose, but the proof of any number we choose is almost impossible. The state of the proof is hesitant between a huge number of figures and the probability of any number we choose by one divided by the total number. Suppose the numbers are hesitant - for example - from one million to two million stars. In that case, the probability of any number we choose is one in a million, which is a very weak and insignificant probability, while the negation acquires the corresponding probability. It becomes very powerful and is as close as possible to certainty, which is a million except one divided by a million.

This rule helps us in matters related to social trust and its lack of it. The difference between them is not a difference in the results of which the two parties are equal, but the difference between them is great and cannot be estimated. To clarify this, if someone told us about Zaid's

location and we were likely to be in one of ten locations, for example, then if we trusted the person's news, the probability would be in one location out of the ten locations, where it is expected and not others. Whereas if we do not trust the news, The axis of negation will be the most likely for any location we choose, and our hesitation will continue to revolve between the ten possible locations. Here, we did not encounter two opposite probabilities but rather an expected probability in the case of confidence in the face of ten possibilities in which hesitation is occurring. In the case of distrust, the cycle will turn into the opposite, where negation is likely for any position we choose. So what if the possibilities and frequencies are open and uncountable as if it exceeds a hundred or a thousand probability possibilities?! It is clear that this would invite misguidance and deprivation of knowing the truth?! In the sense that the negation is expected without proof.

In general, negation has many possibilities, while there is only one case for proof. This makes the preference in favor of the negation due to a large number of its possibilities and probabilities compared to the single case of proof. It is the case that represents the objective aspect of the case, and there is no doubt that this aspect is intended to be proven and determined, while the possibilities in the case of negation are many without limits.

This rule applies to the semantics of texts when hesitating about their true contents without preference. If the hesitating is many, identifying any content of them becomes excluded. According to this, it is not possible to extract binding beliefs from religious texts when there is hesitation in their contents. Rather, such beliefs are excluded if the probabilities and possibilities of hesitation increase. The most important thing that applies to this matter is the narrations in the science of hadith and the sciences that branch from it, such as jurisprudence. Every narration carries many hesitations, and every hesitating is a probability, and every probability is weak, and it gets weaker according to the increase in hesitations and probabilities. Opinions may appear on a single issue, sometimes reaching

approximately ten, each of them claiming or thinking that it has a certain knowledge of the Islamic religion, which means that nine-tenths of these opinions are not part of the religion at all, to make it clear to us logically, that - when hesitating - we bet on knowledge of religion with a probability of only one in ten.

The reference

<https://www.fahmaldin.net/index.php?id=2571>