Cognitive Will
Yahya Mohamed
Human knowledge is subject to two different authorities: epistemic (belief reasoning) as we defined previously, and volitional (psychological). But the final verdict is mainly for the second authority, rather than the first. In reality, the psychological choice is the one that makes the final decision.
There is a factor in the human psyche that is independent in determining the cognitive decision. Even if the psyche is affected by subjective and objective biases, its decision remains not inevitable to be one way or another. The decision neither arises from the objectivity of the evidence nor from subjective biases, but rather it arises due to (the cognitive will), for it takes the free and non-binding decision. The resulting decision is above all types of knowledge, regardless of its nature, even if that knowledge included logical and intuitive deductions.
We can imagine the cognitive will in the form of a judge who has two advisors, one on the right and one on the left, one of whom calls him to objective evidence and the other to subjective bias, that is when concepts become confused and intertwine with objectivity and bias due to numerous influential factors.
But despite the contradictory call of the advisers, the cognitive will remains the master of the situation, as it is an affected will, but its outcome is not inevitable, therefore it entertains transcendental independence as a decision-maker, whether in favor of objective or subjective bias according to justifying reasons. Usually, this depends on the nature of the cognitive field, as some fields have areas prepared for bias, and others have areas prepared for objectivity. But in all cases, the result is subject to the cognitive will, which is responsible for the decision in the end.
In other words, all knowledge depends on the final decision, and the latter is only achieved by positive and negative cognitive will. When this will decides that it does not want to obtain the inferred results it will act negatively towards these results, no matter how logical, justified and correct they seem. It would have been entirely positive had it not been for the desire of the will to prevent it, and this is what makes this will fabricate rejecting justifications, whether they were acceptable and rational justifications, or irrational. The negative rejection mentioned here is subject to the will. It is neither subject to the conceptual mind represented by evidence nor to external influences.
The action of the will becomes evident when this negativity expresses an irrational or acceptable position, so we know that we are not about a pure epistemological debate, Rather, it is a desire debate determined by the cognitive will, and it falls within the framework of psychology and cognitive sociology. This is what we witness in every cognitive debate, whether religious and sectarian, philosophical or even scientific.
Although the cognitive will is biased in the general sense that includes both objective and subjective biases, none of these biases has any authority in decision-making, unlike the will. Therefore, each of us may have a desire and bias toward certain cognitive results; whether at the level of logic, reality, or metaphysics.
For example, some of us are tempted by every evidence related to the existence of God, while others are tempted to the contrary because of their desire there to be no God. This desire and wishful thinking have nothing to do with the evidence presented, but in terms of the decision, anyone of us may take a decision in support of what he desires despite the contradictory evidence for that, while the other may decide in support of the evidence despite violating his biased desires and wishes. In the sense that he makes a decision contrary to his bias or that he reaches a result that he does not desire, yet he decides what confirms it according to the cognitive will. This case represents the greatest type of objectivity. Therefore, the decision of the cognitive will is not subject to bias or unbias, just as it is separate from the nature of the evidence, despite it being affected by these various fields.
In terms of analysis, the cognitive will differs from the mind that produces ideas devoid of concepts, unlike the mind that is enveloped in it, for the mind does not produce without these covers.
The status of the cognitive will comes from the point that it is a pure will rather than a mind, and it is part of the general psychological will with which it shares the feature of the decision-making of preference.
If the structure of the general will is related to behavior, physical actions, and pure psychological imaginary appearances; The cognitive will move away from this situation to face another different aspect, mainly the cognitive field, so its cognitive decisions are taken due to the fact that it confronts the mind and its concepts face to face without any cover, as it is devoid any concept, as it also faces other factors related to the existential world. The mind, with its concepts, affects the will, likewise, it is affected by other factors that it encounters, sometimes in an unconscious way. It is through these two different confrontations that it takes its decision. As for how and by what standards, all of these things are metaphysical, just as there is no inevitable law that makes us realize what law is followed, but there are statistical laws that make the cognitive will predisposed in some aspects to objective aspects, while in other aspects it is prone to bias.
Therefore, according to our reading, there is nothing forcing humans to submit to any religious, philosophical, scientific, or even intuitive concept, such as mathematical rules like three plus three equals six, submission to the law of general causality, or submission to the principle of non-contradiction in its two forms (existential and logical). Moreover, we find philosophers and thinkers who sometimes challenge such premises, which confirms the authenticity of free will and cognitive decision.
In other words, if the cognitive will accepts these rational judgments as a priori; On the other hand, we must be aware that there are people who have the will to reject them and do not see themselves as compelled to accept them. We find this rejection sometimes within philosophical and scientific circles, and it increases in postmodernism intellectuals.
Even when it is said that undermining these rulings totally leads to an epistemological contradiction, this does not affect the cognitive will, as it does not include concepts, nor is it a purely mental activity, rather, it is a rational psychological authority with a decision that controls all cognitive forms, be it sensory, mental, logical, philosophical, scientific, and others. Or it is a “self-acting” without how; It is influential in cognitive mental activity and completely controlled, regardless of the results reached by this will. Therefore, it does not have the frameworks of the concepts and ideas that the mind has, meaning that it is not molded within a conceptual or intellectual framework, as is the case in the mental act when it exercises its cognitive activity as a mechanism that produces knowledge in all its theoretical and practical forms. However, it often supports rational or inferred visions when it is free from subjective biases.
Undoubtedly, the support, which is referred to previously, makes it conscious and rational, in contrast to the blind unconscious will in itself, as presented by Schopenhauer, the German philosopher, in his outstanding project (The World as Will and Representation). He meant by it the will of desires, impulses, and bodily inclinations, which internalize the whole world - organic and inorganic - as a deep creative essence of everything that is present and manifested in nature.
The will can be depicted as a unified body extending over conscious and unconscious areas, such as the extension of the soul over the body. It is imprinted with impressions of what it extends to, so it is conscious and rational with the mental, and unconscious and irrational with non-rational elements such as mental and physical tendencies and whims.
Translation review by Ali al-Inizi
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The reference
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