

Evidence of Occurrence does not Prove the Existence of God!

Evidence of Occurrence does not Prove the Existence of God!

Yahya Mohamed

Many people mistakenly imagine that the evidence of occurrence or possibility and necessity proves the existence of God.

In this case, the most that this evidence can do is to prove the necessary existence without specifying whether it is included within the framework of the material and natural universe, or its immanence or separate from it.

The ancient scholars believed that this evidence is sound in proving the existence of God. This is what is known to the theologians (mutakallimⁱⁿ) as evidence of occurrence, and to philosophers of evidence of possibility and necessity, and despite several detailed differences between the two evidences, they relate in terms of analysis to one evidence of its occurrence. The possibility that the philosophers talk about includes this occurrence that the theologians want. Despite this, they do not provide evidence for the existence of God through the purely possible, but through what is here (that is, in the earthly world), which is an occurrence, where possibility precedes it, and that for it to become necessary existent, it will need a cause and that this transformation is itself an occurrence, and so this aspect sequences until the necessity to stop at the necessary existent.

Avicenna (Ibn Sina) had previously proposed this evidence in his book (Al-Najat) by saying:

“Undoubtedly there is existence, and all existence is either necessary or possible. If it is necessary, then in fact there is a necessarily existent

being, which is what is sought. If it is possible, then we will show that the existence of the possible terminates in a necessarily existent being. Before that, however, we will advance some premises”.

Then he said: “It is permissible for the causes to be the causes of occurrence themselves if they remain with the coincidences, and in the case of a coincidence they will inevitably end in the necessary existent, since “We have shown that the causes do not go infinitely and do not revolve.”

Before Avicenna, Aristotle used to say: ‘Every event is possible before it happens’, and philosophers acknowledge that the existences under the moon are always occurring infinitely according to the homogeneity link between the cause and the effect, and therefore they will always need this causality to continue their occurrence and its existence. They deny that the basis on which it depends is a body because the body is in itself subject to the occurrence, as it is capable of division, connection, separation, and so on.

This is the basis upon which to prove the existence of God.

Today, however, we know that our natural world includes not only familiar bodies and materials but also other non-physical and non-material elements. This fact informs us that the most that the previous evidence can reach is to prove the necessary existent, without specifying whether it is included in the framework of the material and natural universe, immanent or separate from it. The philosophers deny that the necessary existent is a body that does not necessarily mean the separation of necessary existent to the world. Likewise, the characteristics of the aforementioned bodies do not necessarily preclude that their origin is due to some fixed elements as representative of the necessary existent in particular.

According to this fact, we believe that this evidence is incomplete, as it cannot determine the position of the necessary existent, whether it is included in our material and the natural world, is immanence or

separated from it completely. Thus, we ask: Is the causality controlling the chain of occurrence implicit or extrinsic? Some natural origins in our world may have a fixed nature to generate events spontaneously without being derived from something else, similar to the self-transformation of unstable heavy atoms. This is what we express by implicit causation, i.e. the causation within the physical and natural framework and not outside it.

Some sought to support this evidence by distinguishing between the cause and the sufficient cause, as is the case with the monk Frederick Copleston in his dialogue with the British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1948), and as he said: The necessary cause is a kind of sufficient cause, and that the possible being is what needs a necessary cause. As for God, He is a sufficient cause of itself and is not the cause of Himself. In other words, the need of the chain of events for an external cause is because they do not possess sufficient causes by themselves, otherwise, they would have become necessary to exist, but they are not; Because every member of it is a potential occurrence.

We believe that the source of Copleston's error is due to not paying attention to the radical difference between the concepts of sufficient cause and causality. If the cause is due to existential causation, then the sufficient cause is not due to it, but to another causation of an epistemic nature, and we have called it in an independent study "belief causation," so one of the two concepts cannot be traced back to the other.

According to this logic, we find sufficient reason to stop at a final cause, not on the determination, if it is implicit as in material and natural elements, or immanence without being natural, or completely metaphysical as in the transcendent God. In all cases, every event will need a cause until the matter ends in something that does not need another, and the latter either belongs to the natural cosmic world or does not belong to it. The nature of this concept is not determined unless other signs external to the customary concept of occurrence are

taken into consideration.

We point out that our previous discussion relates to eternal events as believed by the ancient philosophers. But if these events were not eternal, as in the modern physical belief, this would indicate external causation. However, there is no guarantee that the world will occur in its entirety, as the universe may be an event within a series of endless generated universes.

Therefore, three possibilities can be proposed concerning the origin of the universe as follows:

- 1 - Either we suggest that the universe occurred instantaneously, as is prevalent with physical theories.
- 2 - Or we suggest that the universe is eternal, despite the variance of its events without constancy.
- 3 - Or we suggest that the universe is eternal, with constant events without variation.

These are three possible propositions, and if we disregard the nature of the cosmic system, the last thesis indicates implicit causation, as it assumes that events are going on at one constant pace infinitely, as was the belief of the ancient philosophers, meaning that from the nature of the universe created events continuously without beginning or end and the same without variation. This means, contrary to the old philosophical perception, that there is no need to add an external cause that goes beyond the cosmic framework.

While the first thesis requires an external cause, there is no justification for the sudden cosmic emergence without a cause, since nothing arises from pure nothingness according to the principle of general causation.

The same is the case with the second thesis, for the lack of consistency

in the generation of events infinitely indicates external causation. Hence, things have their times; Man - for example - is not eternal, to say that from the nature of matter is the ability to create him continuously without interruption. The same applies to the rest of the other living and non-living species. More importantly, the assumption of the eternity of creation is not incompatible with this causation.

To clarify that since the cosmic change is not at a single frequency in terms of variation, this reveals that it has an external cause, whether it is immanence or transcendent since if the change had occurred according to the intrinsic nature of matter, it would have taken place at a single frequency, that is, the change would have been constant without variation, it would be simple without a precise and complex system. Variation is indicative of the existence of an external cause that leads to it, as it is deduced from the principle of general causation, since every variation is a sudden new emergence that has not occurred before, and it needs an explanation outside the framework of the material that includes the immutable natures. It is not explained by any other than the aforementioned reason.

In actual fact, the covariance occurs, whether in terms of the first or second thesis, which needs an external explanation and by which the external cause is proven, whether it is immanence or transcendent according to the 'weak meaning.'

Likewise, the precise system that this universe includes also needs an immanent or metaphysical reason, for there is no perfect system that does not indicate an organized mind, or what is known as the intelligent design, which is the meaning that mediates and adds something new to the previous meaning. If it is proven that the universe has a specific purpose, then the case will require a greater significance as it refers to an intentional will and as much as the objective transcends as much as indicates the wisdom and greatness of the will i.e. the 'strong meaning'.

Translated by **Zaid Kanady**

The reference

<https://www.fahmaldin.net/index.php?id=2589>