

Types of Rational Propositions

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There is a map of rational propositions that is unfamiliar to philosophers. The ancient philosophers did not distinguish the differences among these propositions, that is because all of them are characterized by necessity and absolute certainty without any other possibility. Modern philosophers follow their steps regarding this concept, as they often limit necessities only to purely logical premises. While we find six different forms of rational propositions, four of them are characterized by different patterns of necessity that do not tolerate doubt or probability. The other two types are characterized by being intuitive rather than necessary.

With regard to the four rational necessities, sometimes the necessity is purely logical, as in the law of (logical) non-contradiction, as one added to one equals two. The second is based on a non-falsifiable rule, as in the principle of general causality and existential non-contradiction. The third is a probable necessity, as in rational possibilities, it arises in identical cases like the heads and tails of the coin. The fourth is a moral necessity as in ethical values.

Some of the aforementioned necessities differ from each other, but the common characteristic among all of them is that they cannot be changed or replaced, and that is because of their comprehensive and absolute nature, which eventually includes the last type of necessities that is related to the practical reason in order to distinguish it from the other types included in the theoretical reason.

The difference between these necessities is that the first (logical) necessity is related to abstract theoretical issues within the epistemic field and cannot be challenged at all, for challenge causes a contradiction.

The second (non-falsifiable) necessity is directly related to the objective reality within the ontological field, as it is informative and revealing reality. Therefore, its necessity, although non-falsifiable, but can be challenged, considering that its violation does not lead to a contradiction, unlike the logical necessity.

As for the third (probable) necessity, it basically has a fractal structure that falls between zero and one. It corresponds to logical necessity, but when it talks about reality, it will necessarily be inconsistent with it in most cases. This is what distinguishes it from other necessities.

We are left with moral necessity. It does not deal with the things in the existential and formative reality, and therefore it cannot be judged as some try to judge the non-falsifiable necessity. Rather, it is important to view it with a direct vision according to what the rational intuition yields that is aware of its absolute comprehensiveness within its own limitations, like other theoretical reasoning necessities.

These are four types of necessary rational propositions, in addition to two other rational types that are characterized by intuition without necessity, namely: the existential knowledge, which is represented in our direct knowledge of ourselves without the need for evidence, and therefore does not accept Cogito the Cartesian inference that states: (I think; therefore I am). The second is intuitive informative knowledge, such as belief in the overall objective reality of the world. This knowledge does not infer necessity, nor can it be evidential, and therefore it is purely intuitive knowledge.

Thus, we have six types of rational propositions, four of them are necessary, and two are devoid of necessity. All of them can be summarized in the following points:

1 - Pure logical knowledge, such as the law of logical non-contradiction.

2 - Non-falsifiable informative knowledge, such as the principle of

general causality and existential non-contradiction.

3- Probabilistic knowledge, such that the probability of the appearance of the heads of the same two-sided coin is necessarily equal to half.

4- Moral knowledge, such as rational reasoning of good and evil.

5- Existential knowledge, like our direct knowledge of ourselves.

6- Intuitive informative knowledge, such as the belief that there is a reality outside the mind.

Most of this knowledge is the key to making the closed doors of knowledge open, and without them, knowledge in all its forms remains closed. Some of them are considered the basis for all cognitive issues, and if it were not for them, all knowledge would have fallen, as is the case with the principle of non-contradiction.

Also, some of them are the basis of our knowledge of the external objective reality, and if it was unclear, our knowledge of this reality would be disturbed and natural science would fall, as is the case with the principle of general causality. Such is the inductive instrument based on probabilistic logic, without which we would not have been able to know anything outside the mind. These issues have an instinctive origin and eyewitnesses, such as what the mystics say.

Likewise, from this knowledge, we witness the reality of the objective world, although our sense of this reality did not come through logical necessity or other rational necessities, as is the case with the principles that preceded it.

For there is no rational objection to the matter being other than what we feel instinctive, although our subjective feeling does not bear this meaning.

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The reference

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